

Information Cascades

Advanced Social Computing

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Announcement

- **AST1 out**
 - Due Date: 3/18, 3:30 PM

- **PRP out**
 - Due Date: 3/18, 3:30 PM

Lecture Topics


- Information Cascades
- Cascade Principles
- Simple Cascade Model

Following the Crowd

- Social relations enable people to **influence** each other's behavior and decisions.
 - opinions they hold,
 - political positions they support,
 - activities they pursue,
 - technologies they use, etc.
- **Information cascade**
 - behaviors that cascade from one node to another like an epidemic! and produce **collective outcomes**.
- We aim to reason about why such influence occurs!

Following the Crowd- Cnt.

- Local Mind!
 - Restaurant choice!




Rational to join the crowd rather than to follow your own private information!



Following the Crowd- Cnt.

- Local Mind!
 - 15 people stand on a street corner and stare up into the sky!!!
 - How many passersby stopped and looked up?
 - More people staring up more passersby stopped!
 - all people looking up 45% of passersby stopped!



Following the Crowd- Demo!

- How to start a movement!



TED

Ideas worth spreading

Following the Crowd- Cnt.

- Information cascade often occurs when people **make decisions sequentially**, with later people watching the actions of earlier people.
- From these actions people infer something about what the earlier people know!

Cascade Framework

- There is a **decision** to be made
 - E.g., whether to adopt a new technology, wear a new style of clothing, eat in a new restaurant, or support a particular political position.
- People make decisions **sequentially**.
- People can **observe choices** made by those who acted earlier.
- Each person has some **private info** that helps to make decision.
 - A person **can't directly observe** the other's private info, but he/ she can observe what they do.

Cascade Example

- Urn with 3 (**blue** or **red**) marbles
- A large group of participants
- Each participant:
 - Draws a marble from the urn
 - Looks at the **color**
 - Places it back without showing others
 - **Guesses** whether the urn is **majority-red** or **majority-blue**.
 - Publicly announces his / her guess to others.
- What's the likelihood of urn being **majority-red** or **majority-blue**?



Cascade Example

- Urn with 3 (**blue** or **red**) marbles
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- Each participant:
 - Draws a marble from the urn
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 - **Guesses** whether the urn is **majority-red** or **majority-blue**.
 - Publicly announces his / her guess to others.
- **majority-red** : 50% chance
- **majority-blue**: 50% chance



Cascade Example- Cnt.

- Participants who has guessed correctly receive rewards!
 - So they try to optimize their decisions!

- What should we expect to happen?



Cascade Example- Cnt.

- The First Participant
 - If it's **red** marble
 - guess **majority-red**;
 - If it's **blue** marble
 - guess **majority-blue**.
- First participant's guess conveys **perfect information** about what he has seen.



Cascade Example- Cnt.

- The Second Participant
 - If (s)he sees the same color that the first participant announced, then
 - should guess this color as well.
 - sees the opposite color,
 - will be indifferent
 - Let's assume (s)he breaks the tie by guessing the color she saw.
- Thus, the 2nd participant draws conveys **perfect information** about what (s)he has seen.



Cascade Example- Cnt.

- The Third Participant
 - If the first two guessed opposite colors, then
 - the third should guess the color (s)he sees!
 - If the first two guesses have been the same (say both **blue**)
 - If third participant draws **blue**.
 - Simple!
 - If third participant draws **red**.
 - 3 draws from the urn:
 - **blue, blue, red**. All perfect information!
 - Guess that the urn is **majority-blue**! ignoring his own private information
 - Which, taken by itself, suggested that the urn is majority-red!



Cascade Example- Cnt.

- If first two guesses are the same, the third should be the same as well, regardless of which color was drawn.
- An information cascade has begun!
 - The third participant makes the same guess as the first two, regardless of his own private info!



Cascade Example- Cnt.

- The Fourth Participant and Onward!
 - Let's consider just the cascade case:
 - First two guesses were the same, say **blue**.
 - 3rd guess has to be blue too.
 - 4th participant, heard
 - **blue, blue, blue!**
 - First 2 guesses conveyed perfect info
 - 3rd guess conveys **no** info.
 - It has to be blue no matter what (s)he saw.
 - 4th is in exactly the same situation as 3rd!
 - should guess blue regardless of what (s)he sees.
 - This will continue with all subsequent participants:
 - If first 2 guesses were blue, then everyone will guess blue!



Cascade Example- Cnt.

Summary

- If participant 1 & 2 make the same decision:
 - All will follow this regardless of his signal.
- 3's decision conveys no info!
- Future participants will all be in the same position as participant 3.
- In this case, a cascade has begun.

General Cascades Principles

1. Cascades can easily occur, given the right structural conditions!
 - Based on very little information,
 - **Pre-cascade information** influences the behavior of the population.

General Cascades Principles- Cnt.

2. Cascades can lead to non-optimal (wrong) outcomes!
 - Say the urn is **majority-red!**
 - Chance of the first two participants *draw* blue marbles is small:
 - and thus all others wrongly *guess* blue!

General Cascades Principles- Cnt.

3. Some (*but not all*) cascades can be very fragile!
- Suppose first 2 guesses are blue
 - Participant x and $x+1$ draw red and “show” it to others!
 - $x+2$ has four pieces of **perfect info**:
 - blue (1), blue (2), red (x), red ($x+1$)!
 - Decide based on his / her own draw!

Cascade Model

- Consider a group of people (1, 2, ...) who make decisions **sequentially**
 - decision: **accept** or **reject** some **option**, e.g. adapting a new tech. or voting for a candidate!
- Private signal (info)
 - Each individual gets a *private* signal indicating if accepting is a good or bad idea (*not perfect*).
- Two States:
 - the option is a good idea (G) with probability p
 - $\Pr[G]=p$
 - it's a bad idea (B) with probability $1-p$.
 - $\Pr[B]=1-p$

Cascade Model- Cnt.

- Payoffs: individuals receive payoffs based on their decision to accept or reject the option
 - If reject, payoff = 0.
 - If accept and option is a good idea, payoff = $v_g > 0$
 - If accept and option is a bad idea, payoff = $v_b < 0$
- Expected payoff in the absence of other info is 0;
 - $v_g p + v_b (1 - p) = 0$.
 - before getting any additional info, payoff from accepting is the same as the payoff from rejecting.

Sequential Decision-Making

- Let's consider the perspective of a person.
 - Suppose person N knows that everyone before her has followed their own signal (**accept / reject**)!
 - If $a = r$ (among people before N), then
 - N will follow her own signal.
 - N's signal will be the tie-breaker
 - If $|a - r| = 1$, then
 - N will follow her private signal
 - either N's private signal will make her indifferent or reinforce the majority signal.
- If $|a - r| \geq 2$, then
 - N follow the earlier majority & ignore her own signal.

Sequential Decision-Making- Cnt.




Figure 16.3: A cascade begins when the difference between the number of acceptances and rejections reaches two.

Sequential Decision-Making- Cnt.




Figure 16.3: A cascade begins when the difference between the number of acceptances and rejections reaches two.

Sequential Decision-Making- Cnt.

- It is very hard for $(a - r)$ to remain in such a narrow interval (btw -1 and +1)
 - For example, if 3 people in a row get the same signal, a cascade will definitely begin.

Sequential Decision-Making- Cnt.

- **Claim:** The probability of finding 3 matching signals in a row converges to 1 as the number of people N goes to infinity.
- **Hint:**
 - Divide the first N people into blocks of 3 people

Sequential Decision-Making- Cnt.


- **Claim:** The probability of finding 3 matching signals in a row converges to 1 as the number of people N goes to infinity.
- **Solution:**
 - Divide the first N people into blocks of 3 people
 - [1, 2, 3]; [4, 5, 6]; and so on
 - People in one block receive same signal with probability
 - $q^3 + (1 - q)^3$
 - The probability that none of these blocks consists of identical signals is then
 - $[1 - (q^3 + (1 - q)^3)]^{N/3}$.
 - As N goes to infinity this quantity goes to 0.

Sequential Decision-Making- Cnt.

- Different variations of the same problem:
 - What if people **don't see all the decisions** made earlier but only some of them?
 - What if private signals convey **information with different level of certainty?**
 - What if different people receive **different payoffs?**

Lessons from Cascades

- The **aggregate behavior** of many people with limited info can produce **very accurate results**.
 - If many people are guessing **independently**, then the average of their guesses is often a good estimate
 - Number of jelly beans in a jar!
 - Weight of a bull at a fair!



Lessons from Cascades- Cnt.

- But in cascades, people guess **sequentially**, and
 - Can **observe the earlier guesses** of others,
 - **being influenced** by them,
 - **Conform to majority!**

Lessons from Cascades- Cnt.

- Tension in collaboration
 - Hiring Committee
 - decide if to make a job offer to candidate A or B
 - cascade may develop quickly:
 - A few people initially favor A, others may conclude that they should favor A, even if they initially preferred B!
- Balancing the tension
 - Ask experts to make partial decisions independently before collaboration phase!

Lessons from Cascades- Cnt.

- Marketers use the idea of cascades too!
 - To initiate a **buying cascade** for a new product.
 - Induce an initial set of people to adopt a new product,
 - Other consumers later on may also adopt the product!
 - Even if its worse than competing products!
- Most effective if later consumers are able to observe
 - the adoption decisions (guesses),
 - but, for crappy products, not how satisfied the early buyers are (ball color).

Reading

- Ch.16 Information Cascades [NCM]